Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand by Mark A. Stoler

April 3, 2017 | Strategy | By admin | 0 Comments

By Mark A. Stoler

In the course of global warfare II the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed prone assumed a pivotal and remarkable position within the formula of the nation's overseas guidelines. equipped quickly after Pearl Harbor because the Joint Chiefs of employees, those contributors have been formally accountable just for the nation's army forces. in the course of the battle their capabilities got here to surround a bunch of overseas coverage matters, even if, and so strong did the army voice turn into on these matters that basically the president exercised a extra decisive function of their outcome.Drawing on resources that come with the unpublished documents of the Joint Chiefs in addition to the warfare, military, and kingdom Departments, Mark Stoler analyzes the wartime upward push of army impact in U.S. overseas coverage. He specializes in the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied international method. within the technique, he examines army fears concerning America's significant allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how these fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's regulations, interservice and civil-military family members, military-academic family members, and postwar nationwide defense coverage in addition to wartime method.

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Extra info for Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II

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32 Meanwhile, an older continentalist strand of thought was being revived and revised by army officers who through bitter experiences had witnessed the dangers and problems inherent in the navy’s approach. S. strategic and policy planning: Lieutenant General Stanley Dunbar Embick. Born in 1877 and commissioned from West Point in 1899 as a second lieutenant of artillery, Embick had gradually risen to become by the 1930s a coastal fortifications expert and one of the most senior, highly respected strategic thinkers within the army.

S. interests, and the subsequent need for military preparedness. At the end of World War I Japan had been granted a League of Nations mandate over Germany’s Pacific island possessions north of the equator. United States military planners had objected on the grounds that the islands lay athwart their lines of communication and thus posed a threat in Japanese hands, but they were overruled by their civilian superiors. Their objections were also overruled at the Wash- 6 t h e a r m e d f o r c e s a n d n at i o n a l p o l i c y ington Conference, when the Harding administration agreed to naval and fortification limits that the navy opposed.

In 1932 future World War II cno Ernest J. ’’ 22 By the mid-1930s, however, most naval planners had concluded that serious Anglo-American conflict was unlikely and had reverted to their earlier emphasis on bilateral cooperation. Such cooperation, or at least friendly neutrality, had always been an unstated basis of their orange plans, all of which assumed a peaceful and secure Atlantic ocean controlled by the British fleet. S. S. ends and means in the Pacific, with some viewing it as worse than the original problem.

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