By Robert S. Kaplan, David P. Norton
Read or Download Balanced Scorecard Report - The Strategy Execution Source - Volume 11 Number 2 - Mar-Apr 2009 PDF
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As a chess participant and upload machine programmer i used to be interested from interpreting the canopy of this booklet. i've got traveled in Asia yet by no means capable of prepare how that considering is pursued at a world point. This placed it jointly for me. by means of digging into the the guts of the long run strategic attitude it unfolded alot of rules for me.
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Additional info for Balanced Scorecard Report - The Strategy Execution Source - Volume 11 Number 2 - Mar-Apr 2009
2 slight changes in his Essays in Swedish History (Minneapolis, 1967), 1 9 5 - 2 2 5 . 32 Mic THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY for supply on fixed points, usually magazines located in fortresses. But these vital points, their works now constructed on the multibastioned design, the so-called Italian trace, no longer could be rapidly reduced by artillery. They had to be formally besieged, a lengthy process requiring heavy artillery, much ammunition, and stores. Whole campaigns came to revolve around sieges, considered more important than battles in the field and now also far more numerous, even in the records of commanders wishing to fight in the open.
27 Machiavelli fully recognized that the "short and sharp" war that he envisaged demanded involvement of the soldiers' passions, and would be a ferocious war. For Machiavelli the brutality inherent in war had its ambiguous consequences. It had dangers but also possibilities. The dangers were that the great masses of soldiers, when the struggle became confused and vehement, would no longer obey but think only of their own salvation. They might start looting, hoping to exploit the struggle for their personal advantage.
A factor that Machiavelli clearly misjudged in its importance contributed decisively to this development: the equipment of soldiers with firearms, and the increased role of artillery. As a result, specialized personnel and permanent military establishments formed the necessary core of any army. Expenses, particularly expenses for artillery, grew. Although Machiavelli was aware of the financial needs of any military organization, he certainly had not taken fully into account the growing costs of military equipment with guns and rifles, the interrelationship between economic 28 MACHIAVELLI strength and military strength.